

The Breach Wasn't Stadler's. The Consequence Was.

A shared-infrastructure incident, and the boundary nobody mapped.

INFRASTRUCTURE / DATA / ACCESS / CONSEQUENCE / ACCOUNTABILITY

**The systems can stay clean.
The consequence can still land on you.**

Breach Responsibility Follows Breach Location

If your systems weren't touched and the data wasn't yours — it's easy to assume it's not your incident.

THE REST OF THE DECK BREAKS THIS ASSUMPTION.

Shared infrastructure can separate the place of compromise from the party carrying the consequence.



One Incident. Four Different Boundaries.



The last boundary does not have to match the first three.

Stadler's own IT, production environment, and rail vehicles were not touched.

Five Boundaries. Five Different Answers.

Same incident. Different boundary questions.

01	INFRASTRUCTURE	SHARED	
02	DATA	SUPPLIER	
03	ACCESS	SUPPLIER	
04	CONSEQUENCE	STADLER	
05	ACCOUNTABILITY	STADLER	

Infrastructure — shared. Data — supplier. Access — supplier. Consequence — Stadler. Accountability — Stadler.

This Isn't Supplier Ransomware

~~SUPPLIER RANSOMWARE~~

CONSEQUENCE EXPOSURE

Attackers never entered Stadler's network. The data wasn't Stadler's. Stadler still bore the consequence.



The Pattern Repeats



The same diagnostic applies wherever infrastructure, data, access, consequence, and accountability can land on different parties.

Three Questions Before It's Forced On You

01 **Who owns it?**

02 **Who can access it?**

03 **Who gets named?**

If the answers diverge, you have a consequence-exposure boundary to model.



**If infrastructure, data, access,
consequence, and accountability
don't land on the same party, model
them separately.**

rack2cloud.com | Follow The Architect for more

Data Protection · Consequence Exposure



RACK2CLOUD
Think Like An Architect.
Build Like An Engineer.

Think Like An Architect. Build Like An Engineer.